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 UNITED STATES ANTITRUST POLICY IN AN AGE OF IP EXPANSION 
 
 Herbert Hovenkamp1 
 
A commonplace in the literature on intellectual property and antitrust in the 
United States is that a tension or conflict exists between the two and must be resolved,2 
or that the relationship between them presents a paradox.3  On the one hand, the IP 
laws create a right to exclude.  On the other, antitrust regularly condemns practices 
because they exclude firms from markets.4 
                                            
   1Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law and History, University of Iowa.  My 
comments relate solely to the antitrust and intellectual property laws of the United 
States. 
   2E.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981): 
 
The conflict between the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods they 
embrace that were designed to achieve reciprocal goals. While the antitrust laws 
proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward the 
inventor with a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive 
exploitation of his patented art. 
 
See also David McGowan, Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 
24 J. Corp. L. 485, 485 & n.1 (1999) (recognizing tension); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, 
Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the Intellectual Property Monopoly, 6 J. Intell. Prop. 
L. 1, 3 (1998) (same). 
   3Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 Univ. Penn.L.Rev. 
761 (2002). 
   4In addition to the citations in the previous two notes, thoughtful writing on the subject 
includes Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1813 (1984); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and 
Economic Appraisal (1973); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the 
Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 Yale L.J. 267 (1966).  See also Daniel J. 
Gifford, et al., Symposium: The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law and 
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Antitrust Law: Foreword: Antitrust's Troubled Relations with Intellectual Property, 87 
Minn. L. Rev. 1695, 1714 (2003); Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade 
Commission, Competition and Intellectual Property Policy: The Way Ahead, Remarks at 
the American Bar Association Antitrust Section Fall Forum (Nov. 15, 2001), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/intellectual.htm; Manisha M. Sheth, Note, 
Formulating Antitrust Policy in Emerging Economies, 86 Geo. L.J. 451, 475 (1997). 
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The conflict between IP and antitrust is readily exaggerated.  Further, a 
significant portion of it is explained by deep uncertainty about the optimal amount and 
scope of IP protection.  As long as that uncertainty remains there will always be tension 
between IP and antitrust. 
 
At the policy level antitrust draws clearer lines than IP law does.  Antitrust is 
concerned about practices that limit competition, and -- at least in the range of realistic 
antitrust concern -- "competition" has a reasonably uncontroversial definition.  
Competition exists when the number of buyers and sellers, freedom of trading, and 
market information are sufficient to drive prices toward marginal cost.5  To be sure, one 
should not push the point about antitrust's relative clarity too far.  Many questions 
continue to provoke debate, such as How strictly can we impose marginal cost pricing 
on concentrated markets? How many firms are required for effective competition? or 
How serious is the threat of competitive foreclosure resulting from vertical practices? or 
What are appropriate remedies for unilateral exclusionary conduct? 
 
                                            
   5For the historical evolution see George J. Stigler, "Competition," 1 The New 
Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 531-536 (John Eatwell, et al., eds. 1987); George 
J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J.Pol.Econ. 1 (1957). 
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But this uncertainty is not nearly as broad or deep as the level of our uncertainty 
over intellectual property questions such as What is the optimal length of time for patent 
or copyright protection? What is the appropriate scope of patent claims? When is a new 
collection of technologies or methods patentable? and -- perhaps most fundamentally of 
all -- what is the proper balance between the protection of new ideas and the public 
license innovators must have to build on the innovations of their predecessors?6  This 
final question accounts for many others, such as What is the proper scope of fair use in 
                                            
   6On the extent to which innovation is furthered by borrowing from the innovation of 
predecessors, see Larry Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the 
Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity (2004); Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs 
& Steel: the Fate of Human Societies, ch. 13 (1999) (societies make more progressive 
when innovators have freedom to borrow ideas from previous innovators).  See also 
Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: the Fate of the Commons in a Connected World 
(2001); Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the 
Innovation Process, 29 Res.Policy 531 (2000); Stephen G. Breyer, The Uneasy Case 
for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 
Harv. L.Rev. 281 (1970); Robert M. Hurt and Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic 
Rationale of Copyright, 56 Am.Econ.Rev. 421 (1966); Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, 
The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J.Econ.History 1 (1950). 
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copyright?7 
 
                                            
   7See, e.g., Wendy J. *****Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 
1600 (1982). 
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When comparing the United States antitrust and IP statutes one is struck by the 
relative success that special interest groups have had in obtaining IP legislation, in 
contrast with the relative lack of interest group influence on the antitrust laws.8  This is 
evidenced by the text of the statutes themselves.  Aside from the Robinson-Patman 
Act,9 which admittedly is special interest legislation, the antitrust laws are spare and 
most of their technical meaning has been supplied by judges.  By contrast, the IP laws 
have become increasingly detailed codes directing the courts to provide specific types 
of protections to specific interests.  As a general matter, detailed codes are a sign of 
interest group compromise.10  Particularly when one looks at the industry-specific 
provisions of the Patent Acts, there is no grand principle claiming universal assent, but 
rather a large number of deals struck between Congress and conflicting special 
interests.11  The Copyright Act is even more extreme.12   While antitrust law, properly 
                                            
   8See Christina Bohannan, Construing the Copyright Act after Eldred v. Ashcroft 
(2004).  One can only hope that the Congressionally-created Antitrust Modernization 
Commission, which is currently examining whether the federal antitrust laws need to be 
modernized, will not change this.  See Pub. L. 107-273, 116 Stat 1758 (Nov. 2, 2002).  
On the Commission and its activities, see http://www.amc.gov;  
http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Antitrust_Modernization_Commission; and 
Albert A. Foer, Putting the Antitrust Modernization Commission into Perspective, 51 
Buffalo L.Rev. 1039 (2003). 
   915 U.S.C. '13.  See 14 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Ch. 23 (1999). 
   10See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 
4, 16-18 (1984); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual 
Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 Cal.L.Rev. 2187, 2190 (2000). 
   11See Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L.Rev. 
1575, 1637 (2003). 
   12Ibid.  See also William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process:A Personal 
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applied, is public interest legislation, increasing portions of the IP laws are a series of 
                                                                                                                                             
Perspective, 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 139, 141 (1996): 
   
    Copyright interest groups hold fund raisers for members of Congress, write 
campaign songs, invite members of Congress (and their staff) to private movie 
screenings or soldout concerts, and draft legislation they expect Congress to 
pass without any changes. In the 104th Congress, they are drafting the 
committee reports and haggling among themselves about what needs to be in 
the report. In my experience, some copyright lawyers and lobbyists actually 
resent members of Congress and staff interfering with what they view as their 
legislation and their committee report. With the 104th Congress we have, I 
believe, reached a point where legislative history must be ignored because not 
even the hands of congressional staff have touched committee reports. 
 
See also Merges, One Hundred Years, note 10 at 2235 (on greatly increased lobbying 
in the IP area); John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Patent Myth, 18 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2003) (warning against "the definitional 
gerrymandering of patent lawyers" in designing industry- specific statutes); Jessica 
Litman, Digital Copyright 25-29 (2001) (commenting on the swollen copyright statute 
and the influence of special interest groups). 
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special interest deals. 
 
The extent of IP capture in the United States may be enhanced by the fact that 
the agency that makes most of the initial policy, the PTO, is specialized, responding 
mainly to prospective and actual IP rights holders.  By contrast, the FTC and Antitrust 
Division of the Justice Department, which make most of our public antitrust policy, are 
much more diverse in two senses.  First, they represent a greater variety of markets. 
Second, their constituents represent a much more balanced variety of positions on any 
issue.  While it has not always been so,13 today it is hard to make a case that either of 
                                            
   13Many government brought antitrust decisions from the 1970s and earlier reflected 
small business protectionism at the expense of consumers.  Examples include United 
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270,(1966) (condemning merger in 
unconcentrated market with low entry barriers, fearing a rising tide of concentration in 
the grocery industry); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) 
(condemning merger in unconcentrated market, in part because it created efficiencies 
that injured smaller rivals); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) 
(condemning conglomerate merger, in part because resulting advertising economies 
gave firm an advantage over rivals); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 
(1965) (accepting FTC challenge to merger of sellers of complementary products on 
theory that they might engage in reciprocal buying with others); United States v. E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (accepting government's challenge to 
vertical merger on theory that acquired firm would favor its parent in purchasing inputs); 
In re Foremost Dairies, Inc. 60 F.T.C. 944, 1084 (1962) (condemning a merger because 
the resulting efficiencies gave the firm a "decisive advantage" over "smaller rivals"); 
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (rejecting government 
challenge to newspaper's requirement that advertisers run same ads in morning and 
evening editions even though justified by reduced type setting costs); International Salt 
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (challenge to non-monopolist's requirements 
that users of its salt injector also purchase its salt); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 
316 (1966) (accepting government challenge to Brown's practices of giving special 
services to retailers who favored Brown's shoes); Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 
F.2d 1368 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978) (accepting FTC's challenge 
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the antitrust agencies has an enforcement bias favoring some special interest group, 
such as small business.  While literally thousands of interest groups have petitioned 
Congress over the years for special amendments to the antitrust laws, the list of 
exemptions and qualifications remains relatively small and is in fact dwindling under 
deregulation.14 
 
The theory of interest groups suggests that small, unified and well organized 
groups are much more effective in obtaining the legislation they want than larger, more 
diffuse and differentiated groups.  As a result, too much legislation ends up protecting 
special interests at the expense of society as a whole.15 
                                                                                                                                             
to relatively small ready mix firm's acquisition of a cement supplier); United States v. 
White Motor Co., 194 F.Supp. 562, 576-577 (N.D.Ohio 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 
372 U.S. 253, 256 n.2. (1963) (lower court accepted government challenge to supplier 
setting maximum prices its dealers could charge; issue not appealed to Supreme 
Court); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (accepting 
government's request for per se rule against vertically imposed territorial restraints); 
United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (accepting government's 
request for per se rule against efficient territorial restrictions by joint venture without 
significant market power); FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960) (highly 
anticompetitive decision condemning broker for reducing commission in order to make 
large sale); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) (accepting challenge to 
nonmonopoly salt seller's quantity discount program); MidBSouth Distrib. v. FTC, 287 
F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961) (condemning buying cooperative 
for obtaining low prices on auto parts for its members); FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 
U.S. 746 (1945) (virtually requiring competitors to verify one another's prices in order to 
avoid Robinson-Patman Act violation). 
   14See 1A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &&249-251 (2d ed. 
2000).  The "classic" exemptions were labor and insurance.  See id., &&219-220 
(insurance), &&255-257 (labor).  On the impact of deregulation, see &241. 
   15James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962) Mancur 
Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965; 
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2d ed. 1971).  A good survey of the literature on public choice is Daniel A. Farber & 
Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: a Critical Introduction (1991).  For specific 
application to regulation, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 
Bell J. Econ. & Mgt. Sci. 3 (1971); and Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic 
Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgt. Sci. 335 (1974). 
While the theory of public choice is elegant, it is not particularly robust at 
explaining regulatory choices across the full range of economic markets.  For example, 
in every American state the sale of groceries, shoes, and furniture occurs in 
competitive, generally unregulated markets.  By contrast, in every state retail electricity 
and taxicab fares are price regulated and there may be government restrictions on new 
entry.  Why this pair of outcomes should be virtually universal is certainly not a 
coincidence.  Further, it is highly unlikely that the explanation is that electric utilities or 
taxicab companies are better political organizers or have more unified interest groups 
representing them, while their customers are less well organized.  As a result, these 
particular industries manage to obtain regulatory freedom from competition and 
guaranteed profit margins, while grocers and shoe sellers do not. 
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The important differences between the regulatory choices that have been made 
in these markets is best explained by the basic neoclassical economics of production 
and distribution.  Electricity is a traditional natural monopoly and the traditional solution 
to natural monopoly has been agency price regulation.  Taxis are a market in which, 
according to the given wisdom, transactions have to be made quickly and purely private 
bargaining would yield too much uncertainty and bad results.16 
 
The significance of interest group explanations for regulation in the United States 
seems to be driven by two factors.  The first is how well underlying political markets are 
working.  The second is how clearly policy makers understand the market in question. 
 
If political markets worked perfectly they would yield efficient regulatory solutions 
and public choice theory would not have much of interest to say.  Regulation in such a 
regime would correct market failures and produce efficient markets -- no more and no 
less.  Of course, political markets are not perfect and some are highly imperfect.  As a 
result, regulatory solutions are imperfect as well.  The classic public choice position on 
regulation is that, because of imperfections in government process, we tend to regulate 
too much and we tend to use regulation to transfer wealth to politically successful 
                                            
   16See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise 2004 
Col.Bus.L.Rev. 335, 339 (2004).  Cf. P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating 
the Administrative Process, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 55 (1998); Mark Kelman, On 
Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the 
Public Choice Movement, 74 Va. L. Rev. 199 (1988); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. 
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 895-900 (1987). 
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interest groups rather than producing the economically efficient outcome. 
 
The second important factor determining the robustness of public choice 
explanations is the degree of policy consensus about how a particular market should 
work.  Special interest legislation is most robust in markets where right answers are 
elusive.  The more complex the problem and the less clearly a single solution emerges, 
the more room for special interest groups to make their case to the legislature.  This 
explains why the tax code has so many interest group provisions.  There is no obvious 
"correct" answer to how much taxes should be or how the burden should be distributed 
among various constituencies.  It also explains why interest groups have generally been 
more effective in obtaining legislation in the regulated industries.  While the identification 
of industries that require regulation may be relatively uncontroversial, the ideal form that 
the regulatory enterprise should take seldom is.  So once the state decides to regulate, 
interest groups acquire a stronger voice.17 
 
These facts were clear features of the American regulatory landscape even in the 
nineteenth century.18  For example, toll bridges, railroads and gas utilities tended to be 
price regulated, but not blacksmiths, haberdasheries, or general stores.  In general, the 
effectiveness of the government control over a market varied with the degree of 
                                            
   17See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation History as Politics or Markets, 12 Yale J.Reg. 
549 (1995). 
   18Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937 at 105-170 (1991). 
Hovenkamp, IP Expansion Page 13 
 
 
consensus about how the market worked.  If there was a broad consensus that 
competition was working well, special interests tended not to be very successful.  By 
contrast, when little about a market is known, then alternative regulatory approaches 
are less clear and legislators tended to listen more to interest groups.19 
 
                                            
   19See Hovenkamp, Regulation History, note 17. 
Ambiguity about the correct policy explains why the IP statutes are fairly 
susceptible to interest group capture.  No one really knows the answers to such 
questions as what is the correct term for a patent or copyright, or what is the proper 
scope of such rights, how "non-obvious" an innovation must be before it is patentable, 
what is the appropriate scope of fair use of copyrighted material, and the like. 
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Over the years most statutory amendments to the United States Patent and 
Copyright Acts have tended to expand IP protection.  The term of protection given to 
patents and copyrights has consistently been extended.20  Most other amendments to 
those statutes have tended to expand the scope of protection.  Good examples are the 
patent misuse reform act of 1988,21 or the Digital Millenium Copyright Act.22  The 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act23 has been described as legislation that 
"strongly favored a narrow class of copyright owners, broadly but mildly affected many 
present and future consumers, was intensively lobbied, and became law with little 
opposition."24 
 
                                            
   20On the copyright term, see Christina N. Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act, 30 U.Mem.L.Rev. 363 (2000) (tracing history of copyright terms and 
extensions).  Since 1850 the patent term has gone from 14 years, to 17 years, to its 
current 20 years from application date.  A good summary of changes in the law in both 
areas is contained in Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of The Public Domain, 28 
Dayton L. Rev. 215, 222-224 (2002). 
   21See 35 U.S.C. '271(d).  On the legislative history of '271(d), see Richard Calkins, 
Patent Law; the Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington 
Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 Drake L. Rev. 175 
(1988); Sharon Brawner McCullen, The Federal Circuit and the Ninth Circuit Face-off: 
Does a Patent Holder Violate the Sherman Act by Unilaterally Excluding Others from a 
Patented Invention in more than one Relevant Market?, 74 Temple L. Rev. 469, 494 et 
seq (2001). 
   22Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
   23Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 
U.S.C.). 
   24Mergers, One Hundred Years, note 10 at 2236. 
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While the degree of special interest capture in IP legislation has tended to 
increase over time, the courts have been less consistent and have tended to go in 
cycles, particularly where conflicts between IP and competition policy are concerned.  
For example, in the early nineteenth century the courts interpreted patent rights very 
expansively, with the result that relatively few patent practices were found to constitute 
antitrust violations or patent "misuse"25 based on the perceived anticompetitive 
consequences of the conduct.  For example, in Henry the Supreme Court permitted a 
patentee to enforce a notice on its duplicating machine that the licensee could use the 
machine only with the paper, ink and other supplies provided by the patentee.26  The 
Supreme Court permitted an action for contributory infringement against a person who 
sold such supplies to someone who intended to use them in one of A.B. Dick's 
machines.  Henry represented a high point in Supreme Court patent law expansionism 
because it permitted patentees to "tie" unpatented goods even if they were staple 
commodities, and interpreted the doctrine of contributory infringement so as to reach 
the seller of such staples. 
 
                                            
   25On IP "misuse," see discussion infra, text at note 34 et seq. 
   26Henry v. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. 1 (1912). 
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In the Paper Bag case the Supreme Court also ended a controversy over 
whether less protection should be given to unused, or "unworked," patents.27  
Previously, some courts had either denied infringement actions based on patents that 
the patentee was not actually practicing or licensing to others.  Other decisions 
permitted the actions but limited plaintiffs' relief to damages.28 
                                            
   27Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).  
The right was very likely codified in 35 U.S.C. '271(d)(4).  See Janice M. Mueller, 
Symposium: Patent System Reform: Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry 
Standards, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 623, 680 (2002). 
   28E.g., Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co. v. Carborundum Co., 189 F. 710 (C.C.W.D. 
Pa. 1900); Dorsey Harvester Revolving Rake Co. v. Marsh, 7 F. Cas. 939, 945 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1873).  But the issue of unworked patents has continued to provoke 
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Finally, the Bement decision,29 expanded in 1926 in the General Electric case,30 
permitted patentees to fix the product price charged by competing licensees who sold 
the patented good in competition with the patentee. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
controversy even since the Paper Bag decision.  See Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 
850 F.2d 660, 671  (Fed. Cir. 1988) (refusing to award lost profits as damages for 
infringement because patent was unworked); Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 
F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) (taking into consideration whether party practiced 
welding system patent).  See also Hartford-Fairmont Co. v. United States Glass Co., 2 
F.2d 109, 110  (W.D. Pa. 1924); Dorsey Harvester, 7 F. Cas. 939; Landis Tool Co. v. 
Ingle, 286 F. 5, 6-7 (3d Cir. 1923): Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., v. Toledo, 172 F. 
371, 372  (6th Cir. 1909). 
   29E. Bement & Sons v. Nat. Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902). 
   30United States v. Gen. Elect. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).  See 2 Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Mark D. Janis, and Mark A. Lemley, IP and Antitrust: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles 
Applied to Intellectual Property Law, ch. 31 (2004); 12 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &2041 (2d ed. 2005). 
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Beginning in the 1930s the Roosevelt Court did a complete about face and 
began to see patents and later copyrights as inherently anticompetitive and antitrust, or 
the related doctrine of misuse, as the cure.31  A series of decisions both imagined that 
patents conferred significant market power, even in what appeared to be robustly 
                                            
   31A contemporary book which well captures the change of viewpoint was written by 
Legal Realist Walton Hamilton.  See Walton Hale Hamilton, Patents and Free Enterprise 
161 (1941)). 
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competitive markets, and also believed it was quite easy for firms to "enlarge" these 
monopolies simply by tying patents together or bundling patented and unpatented 
goods.32 
                                            
   32The important precursor was Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 
283 U.S. 27, 29 (1931), which refused to enforce an action for contributory infringement 
against one who sold dry ice to licensees of the patentee's patented ice box, when its 
license required licensees to purchase their ice exclusively from the patentee; Court 
believed that patentee was attempting to "extend its monopoly" over unpatented 
supplies.  See also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) 
(condemning tying by firm that lacked real market power, holding that the power 
conferred by the patent is all that was necessary to make tying unlawful); Mercoid Corp. 
v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 669 (1944) (finding patent use when the 
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patentee bundled the different elements in a combination patent);; Court saw the 
bundling as an attempt to extend the monopoly of the patent so as to create a larger 
monopoly); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (refusing to 
enforce a patent against an infringer because the patentee was tying salt to its patented 
salt injector; no market power requirement other than Court's observation that patentee 
was attempting to use the monopoly of the patent to create a second "limited monopoly" 
in salt tablets; tablets themselves were a commodity in which patentee had no power); 
B. B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942) (patentee who tied shoe insole 
material to its patented insole machine could not bring infringement action; no market 
power requirement); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) 
(condemning tying even when the tied element was an essential part of the patented 
process); International Business Mach. Corp. (IBM) v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 
(1936) (condemning tying of IBMs computing machines to its paper punch cards).  
Other decisions include United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 156-159 
(1948) (condemning block-booking of feature films as enlarging "the monopoly of the 
copyright"); United States v. Loew's, 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (extending Paramount to block-
booking of television shows; again inferring power from the existence of the copyright). 
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That era was quite properly brought to a close, mainly as a result of Chicago 
School writings that exploded the leverage theory of patents, and more general writings 
that began to treat patent rights as simply a species of property, with the attendant 
power to exclude, rather than as a species of monopoly.33 One result is that antitrust 
tribunals today are quite properly far more tolerant ot IP rights today than they were 
from the 1930s through the 1960s, and antitrust claims in IP markets have become 
more difficult to prove.  Now the question is whether are in danger of going too far. 
 
Appropriate Antitrust Responses 
 
How should antitrust respond to a regime in which the intellectual property laws 
very likely grant more than the optimal amount of protection and where the ongoing 
amendment process reflects significant capture by special interests?  The harmful 
results include, at the least, costly impediments to innovation, the high licensing and 
transaction costs of negotiating through the thicket of IP rights, leading to underuse of 
innovations.34  On top of all of this is higher consumer prices. 
                                            
   33E.g., Bowman, note 4; Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent 
System, 20 J L & Econ 265 (1977).  For summaries, see William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, ch. 1 (2003); 
Hovenkamp, Janis, & Lemley, note 30 at '4.2.  On the history of the Supreme Court's 
presumption of market power from patents and copyrights, mainly in tying cases, see 10 
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &1733 (2d ed. 2004). 
   34On the "thicket" created by excessive IP protection, Lessig, note 6.  See also Burk 
and Lemley, note 11; Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 Calif. L.Rev. 521 
(2003); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 
91 Calif. L. Rev. 439 (2003); Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox 
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Through Tripartite Innovation, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1047, 1085 et seq (2003); R. Polk 
Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of 
Control, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 995 (2003); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: 
Cross Licensing, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in Innovation Policy and the 
Economy (Adam Jaffe et al., eds. 2001); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of 
Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1177, 1179 (2000); Mark D. Janis, Second 
Tier Patent Protection, 40 Harv. Int'l L.J. 151, 200 (1999); Michael A. Heller, The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 
Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998). 
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First, it is not antitrust's purpose to interfere in legislative decisions about the 
scope of IP rights, even if those legislative acts result from socially harmful 
acquiescence to interests group pressure.  Courts have other tools at their disposal for 
limiting the power of special interests, in particular, the canons of statutory 
construction.35  But antitrust was never intended to be and is not a device for fixing 
special interest legislation.  Antitrust was designed to correct economic markets, not 
political markets.36 
 
                                            
   35See Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va.L.Rev. 
1575 (2003) (mainly, patent).  More generally, see Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting 
Statutory Default Rules, 102 Col.L.Rev. 2162 (2002); Frank H. Easterbrook, The 
Supreme Court, 1983 Term--Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. 
L. Rev. 4, 15-18 (1984); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 533 (1983). 
   36See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: the Law of Competition and its 
Practice, '18.1 (3d ed. 2005); Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 
note 16. 
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Second, we should never return to the former regime of hostility that dominated 
antitrust in the United States courts during the period from the New Deal through the 
Warren era.  Characteristic of that era were presumptions of market power where none 
existed, and the general notion that patent power was easily "extended" or enlarged 
through simple contract devices.  Most of this law condemned practices that were not 
anticompetitive. Indeed, many of them were socially beneficial devices for reducing 
transaction costs37 or enabling patentees to maintain the quality of their product.38  
The presumption that an IP right is inherently monopolistic, or that it confers significant 
market power on its owner, is no more correct today than it was a half century ago.39  
Further, it remains the case that very few vertical contract practices, such as tying, have 
robust anticompetitive explanations. 
 
                                            
   37Examples are the block booking condemned in Loew's and Paramount; and many 
of the tying arrangement cases listed in note 32.  On block-booking, see F. Andrew 
Hanssen, The Block booking of Films Re-examined, 43 J.L. & Econ. 395 (2000); Roy 
W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, How Block Booking Facilitated Self-Encording Film 
Contracts, 43 J.L.& Econ. 427 (2000). On tying, see 9 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &&1703, 1711-1718 (2d ed. 2004). 
   38E.g., International Salt, note 32; IBM, note 32.  
   39The presumption continues to have legal vitality, however.  Four Justices accepted 
it in dicta in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16-17 (1984), 
although the four concurrers expressly rejected it.  Id. at 37 n. 7.  See also MCA 
Television Limited v. Public Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(accepting the presumption for a copyright in a block-booking decision; in this case, the 
copyrighted work found to have power was syndicated reruns of a television detective 
show, Magnum, P.I.).  See also  Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 
1341B42 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985) (accepting the presumption 
for a copyrighted computer operating system, RDOS, even though it was not the market 
dominant system). 
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While the evidence of legislative capture is strongest in the area of copyright,40 
there is even less room for antitrust intervention than in the case of patents.  Outside of 
copyrighted computer software, copyrights are less effective tools of monopoly than 
patents are.  Setting aside software, a copyright is less likely to create market power 
than a patent is.41  Further,  licensing or infringement disputes over copyrights are 
much less frequently between competing firms -- the typical copyright infringer is not a 
rival of the copyright owner. 
 
But antitrust can pursue unreasonable exercises of market power where they are 
found, and it need not be detained by the IP statutes unless they clearly immunize the 
challenged practice.  Here, the principles of statutory construction may become 
relevant: ambiguous statutes that reflect special interest capture should generally be 
construed against the special interests that were responsible for them.  First, such 
statutes should be regarded as no more than private bargains, and as such they are to 
be construed as any contract is.  Second, and more importantly, if Congress dislikes the 
construction the court gives, the powerful special interest is in the best position to get 
                                            
   40See Burk & Lemley, note 35; Lessig, note 6. 
   41See 1 Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, IP and Antitrust, note 30 at '4.2a. 
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the statute changed so as to make its meaning clearer.  The result is greater 
transparency in law making.42 
 
                                            
   42On the Copyright Act, see Bohannan, note 8; more generally, see Easterbrook, 
note 10; Elhauge, note 35. 
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When a practice poses a significant threat to competition, it should not be saved 
by an ambiguous IP provision.  One corollary of the principle that an IP right is simply 
property is that no special deference is due to the IP laws when courts fashion remedies 
for proven antitrust violations.  For example, ordering compulsory licensing for a proven 
antitrust violation is no different than fining a firm or ordering divestiture of a plant.43  
While we do not want to deter innovation, we do want to deter antitrust violations either. 
 While the Patent Act provides that a refusal to license is not patent misuse,44 that 
provision has the same status as the common law rule that the owner of real property 
has no duty to share it.  That does not mean, however, that property rights cannot be 
forfeited for proven violations.45  To be sure, application of antitrust remedies can get 
courts mired in such things as setting reasonable royalty rates, an activity for which they 
are very poorly suited.  But these problems are rarely different for IP rights than for 
                                            
   43For a generally contrary position, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace vs. 
Property Law, 4 Tex. Rev. L. & Politics 103 (1999). 
   4435 U.S.C. '271(d). 
   45See 3 Antitrust Law &710 (2d ed. 2001). 
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other types of property interests.46 
 
                                            
   46In general, compulsory dealing orders pose serious administrative difficulties when 
the refusal is unilateral, but much less substantial when it is the product of an 
agreement.  See 11 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &1903 (2d ed. 2005). 
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Antitrust tribunals in the United States should also take a more aggressive 
approach to acquired patents, particularly when they are unused.  Free licensing of 
patents is an essential incentive to innovation.  But acquisitions of exclusive patent 
rights need not be entitled to the same degree of deference as internally developed 
patents.47 
 
A rule limiting the exclusionary power of unused, or "unworked," patents also 
limits the incentive to innovate.  Many innovations are unplanned, often the byproduct of 
innovation in other areas.  Firms in rapidly changing markets often innovate far out into 
the future.  At the same time, however, dominant firms often employ strategies of 
patenting everything possible, whether or not they intend to use it, simply to create a 
wall around their own technologies.48  The Patent Act provides that simple nonuse of a 
patent is not "misuse," but this does not preclude the pursuit of nonuse under the 
antitrust laws when market power and unreasonable exclusionary effect are shown. 
 
When significant market power is present, little deference should be given to 
                                            
   47For an example of such deference, see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 
(2d Cir. 1981).  See also 3 Antitrust Law &708e (2d ed. 2002); Burk & Lemley, Policy 
Levers, note 35 at 1666-1667; Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public 
Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 389 (2002). 
   48See Merges, One Hundred Years, note 10 at 2220; and Leonard S. Reich, The 
Making of American Industrial Research:Science and Business at GE and Bell, 
1876-1926 (1985). 
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patents that are both acquired49 and unused.  A firm ordinarily acquires a patent, or 
obtains an exclusive license, either to practice the patent itself, include it in a license 
package, or else to deny access to rivals.  While the first two of these activities are 
almost always procompetitive the last one typically is not. 
 
                                            
   49The acquisition itself may be unlawful, under either '1 of the Sherman Act or '7 of 
the Clayton Act.  See 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &707 (2d 
ed. 2002) (treated as exclusionary practice); 5 Phillip E Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law 1202f (2d ed. 2004) (treated as merger). 
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United States antitrust tribunals should also be somewhat less deferential than 
they currently are to settlements of IP disputes.  In general, we want firms to settle their 
bona fide intellectual property disputes, and in most cases the impairment of 
competition threatened by a settlement agreement is no greater than that which would 
result from a court judgment upholding the intellectual property right.  But the possibility 
of settlements creates incentives to cartelize markets.  As a result, settlements that 
would constitute antitrust violations in the absence of a valid IP right must be given fairly 
close scrutiny.50  In particular, the Supreme Court should overrule its General Electric 
decision and permit the lower courts to scrutinize patent licensing agreements that 
                                            
   50For example, the court seemed too tolerant in Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 
117 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997), which approved a product market division agreement 
among household chemical manufacturers based on the doubtful premise that the 
"Pine-Sol" trademark infringed the "Lysol" mark.  See 12 Antitrust Law &2046b4 (2d ed. 
2005). 
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include price-fixing provisions.51   
 
                                            
   51United States v. Gen. Elect. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).  Recent applications of the 
rule include LucasArts Entm't Co. v. Humongous Entm't Co., 870 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. 
Cal. 1993); cf. Sample v. Monsanto Co., 218 F.R.D. 644 (E.D.Mo. 2003) (refusing to 
certify class, but noting allegations of price-fixing conspiracy in patented seed).  See 
also Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 289 F.Supp.2d 986, 992 
(N.D.Ill. 2003), where Judge Posner opined of GE that while the Court "upheld the 
arrangement ... I doubt that it would do so today, at least without a further inquiry into 
the strength of the patents and the rationale for the licensing arrangement.  And see 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual 
Property Law 382-384 (2003). 
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The courts should also be more skeptical than the Eleventh Circuit was about so-
called exit payment settlements.52  In such settlements the patentee, and infringement 
plaintiff, settles its dispute with the infringement defendant by means of an agreement 
under which the defendant agrees not to enter the market with its allegedly infringing 
product in exchange for a significant payment from the infringement defendant.  Such 
deals should probably not be per se unlawful.  For example, an exit payment may be 
less than the expected cost of prosecuting and winning the patent infringement claim.  
But they should be subject to very close scrutiny, particularly when the payments are 
larger than the reasonably anticipated cost of litigation, and even more particularly when 
the impact of the settlement agreement is to prevent or delay the entry of other firms 
into the market.53 
                                            
   52Valley Drug Co., Inc. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.2d 1294 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
   53The Hatch-Waxman Act, designed to rationalize the entry of generic drugs when 
pioneer patents expires, gives the first generic filer of an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application, or ANDA, a 180 day exclusivity period which begins to run on (1) the date 
on which the firm begins marketing the generic product; or (2) the date of a court 
decision holding the patent invalid or not infringed.  See 21 U.S.C. '355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  A 
properly crafted settlement may entail that the prospective generic entrant will never 
begin marketing the product and that the patent will never be declared invalid or not 
infringed.  As a result, a settlement agreement under which the pioneer patentee pays 
the generic firm to stay out of the market can operate so as to delay entry by other 
generics significantly.  For a full description of the process, see Hovenkamp, Janis & 
Lemley, note 30 at '7.4e.   
 
Recent Congressional amendments provide that the first generic to file its ANDA, 
which contemplates FDA approval to market a new generic (provided that the product 
does not infringe any still valid patent), is entitled to only 180 days of generic exclusivity. 
 Further, the exclusivity will be forfeited if the generic producer fails to enter the market 
within a reasonable time.21 U.S.C. '355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)   That provision reduces the value 
of anticompetitive settlements because they will be less likely to deter entry indefinitely. 
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 Nevertheless, the gains from an anticompetitive settlement agreement -- and 
corresponding consumer losses -- could still be significant. 
Hovenkamp, IP Expansion Page 35 
 
 
It may also be time for the United States courts to recognize a broader role for 
claims of IP "misuse."  The concept of misuse is simple enough -- certain IP practices 
are deemed harmful and must be penalized, in most cases by denial of the right to 
maintain an infringement action.54  As such, misuse is typically a defense to an 
infringement claim, not an affirmative cause of action.  Most instances of IP misuse 
involve perceived injuries to competition as well; however, the doctrine of misuse has a 
checkered history.  Particularly in the 1930s and 1940s the courts used it to expand the 
scope of antitrust liability by finding misuse where injury to competition was highly 
unlikely.  Indeed, in the case of tying and similar practices, the antitrust law was already 
significantly overdeterrent, and misuse doctrine went even further.55 
 
Since that period the trend has been toward converging antitrust and misuse 
doctrine, although the courts are not fully in agreement.  Judge Posner's opinion in the 
USM case insisted that misuse should be analyzed strictly under antitrust principles.56  
                                            
   54See Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, note 30 at ''3.1-3.2. 
   55See, e.g., Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) 
(finding misuse and denying infringement action in tying case without proof of power; 
suggesting that the conclusion was "analogous" to finding of antitrust violation;); see 
also Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (denying an 
infringement action against an admitted infringer because the plaintiff was tying salt 
tablets to its injection machines, even though infringer was not injured by the tying); 
Lasercomb America v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973, 979 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(noncompetition clause in copyright license constituted misuse; no finding of antitrust 
violation). 
   56USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 
U.S. 1107 (1983).  That view is embraced in the Antitrust Law treatise, but qualified in 
IP and Antitrust.  Cf. 10 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &1781d 
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Decisions in the Federal Circuit have leaned toward the approach that because antitrust 
applies more severe remedies the standard for an antitrust violation should be higher 
than the standard for patent misuse.57 The Fourth took a similar position in a copyright 
misuse case.58 
 
                                                                                                                                             
(2d ed. 2004); with Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, note 30 at ''3.3-3.4, particularly 
'3.4b1 on copyright misuse. 
   57E.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, 882 F.2d 1556, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
("When a party seeks to collect monetary damages from a patentee because of alleged 
violations of the antitrust laws, it is appropriate to require a higher degree of misconduct 
for that damage award than when a party asserts only a defense against an 
infringement claim").  See also Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (finding different standards for tying depending on whether misuse or antitrust 
was involved). 
   58Lasercomb America v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973, 979 (4th Cir. 1990). 
Hovenkamp, IP Expansion Page 37 
 
 
Recently, Judge Posner took a broader view of copyright misuse than his view of 
patent misuse in USM.  In Assessment Technologies the infringement plaintiff owned a 
copyrighted database program that public tax assessors used to collect data about real 
property, and that local governments used to store and organize the data.59  The 
infringement defendant wanted the raw data for use by real estate brokers and when it 
attempted to download that data the plaintiff claimed copyright infringement.  While the 
database itself was copyrightable, the raw data clearly was not.  The court viewed the 
infringement action as an attempt by the copyright holder to "sequester" the 
uncopyrighted data in its copyrighted database, for the data were not practically 
available in any form other than in the database.60  However, there was no showing 
that any relevant market was threatened with monopoly.  Such an application of misuse 
resembles tort law more than antitrust. 
 
                                            
   59Assessment Technologies v. Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003); 361 F.3d 
434 (7th Cir. 2004). 
   60While some tax assessors made hand-written notes, which would have been in the 
public domain, others carried laptop computers to properties and entered the data 
directly into the infringement plaintiff's database.  As a result, much of the data existed 
in no other form than in the database.  See 350 F.3d at 645. 
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However, "misuse" has independent antitrust relevance even when the scope of 
misuse is limited to antitrust violations.  The misuse remedial structure differs from the 
antitrust structure, making remedies available to those who would not have antitrust 
remedies.  In a case such as Microsoft, for example,61 the indirect purchaser rule of 
Illinois Brick62 barred most damages actions by indirect purchasers, because passed-
on damages would have to be computed, something that the indirect purchaser rule 
prohibits.63  One can only guess, but the amount that Microsoft actually paid in 
damages would appear to fall very far short of the amount needed to deter the conduct 
that was found unlawful.  However, the misuse remedy is different, requiring no pass-
on, or even the computation of damages.  When the IP holder has misused its 
intellectual property right it can no longer maintain an infringement action against 
alleged infringers.  Thinking of the consumer harm caused by antitrust violations 
involving IP rights as misuse could lead to a more effective set of remedies.64 
                                            
   61United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 f.3d 34, 49 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 
952 (2001). 
   62Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
   63See 2 Antitrust Law &346 (2d ed. 2000).  However, several states interpreted their 
antitrust statutes so as to permit indirect purchaser damage actions against Microsoft.  
For a list see Antitrust Law &2412d (2004 Supp). 
   64In fact, very little of the Microsoft litigation has involved claims of copyright misuse.  
See Microsoft Corp. v. Jesse's Computer & Repair, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 681 (M.D.Fla. 
2002) (rejecting claim of copyright misuse because there was not a sufficient connection 
between the alleged misuse and the infringement claim); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer 
Support Services of Carolina, Inc., 123 F.Supp.2d 945 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (dismissing 
vague allegations of copyright misuse); Microsoft Corp v. PTI, Inc., 2003 WL 21406291 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2003) (refusing to strike copyright misuse defense). 
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Conclusion 
 
Antitrust's first duty is always to ensure that a real injury to competition has been 
threatened.  As a result, it should not infer power from IP rights too readily, or imagine 
anticompetitive consequences when none exists.  At the same time, however, antitrust 
need not be timid about remedying anticompetitive behavior when it is found, and need 
not be detained by IP defenses that are not clearly defined by the intellectual property 
statutes or the case law that interprets them.  Such an approach is calculated to limit the 
tension that exists between antitrust and the intellectual property laws. 
 
